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Abstract. One of the most popular contemporary graphical password
approaches is the Pattern-Lock authentication mechanism that comes
integrated with the Android mobile operating system. In this paper we
investigate the impact of password strength meters on the selection of a
perceivably secure pattern. We first define a suitable metric to measure
pattern strength, taking into account the constraints imposed by the
Pattern-Lock mechanism’s design. We then implement an app via which
we conduct a survey for Android users, retaining demographic informa-
tion of responders and their perceptions on what constitutes a pattern
complex enough to be secure. Subsequently, we display a pattern strength
meter to the participant and investigate whether this additional prompt
influences the user to change their pattern to a more e↵ective and com-
plex one. We also investigate potential correlations between our findings
and results of a previous pilot study in order to detect any significant
biases on setting a Pattern-Lock.
Keywords: Security, Android, password, bias, usability, feedback
1 Introduction
Innovation in the smartphone industry is now focused on novel user authentica-
tion methods. Apple recently launched their new flagship device with a built-in
fingerprint identity sensor and the new trend has been set. Other smartphone
manufacturers will include this feature to their products but there must exist
devices that should be more a↵ordable to the wide public. This is why traditional
user authentication methods have to be enhanced with security precautions in
order to make them solid against various types of attacks.
Mobile devices are playing a major role to the way we communicate with
others. They are valuable assets to our personal and professional life because
they integrate the most usable and popular applications. Despite the fact that
a smartphone is a telephone device, it can also store sensitive information like
text messages, electronic mail, notes and calendar events. It can record and play
various multimedia files such as photos, audio and video. We can connect to the
2Internet, browse web pages, navigate to our social media accounts and extend its
internal capacity by using cloud storage services. All these capabilities imprint
important personal information on their internal storage. Thus, user protection
and authentication schemes should provide usability and security in a balanced
mixture.
Traditional user authentication is achieved by utilizing text-based methods.
These methods include Personal Identification Numbers (PIN) and text pass-
words. A PIN is usually (but not limited to) a four-digit code and a password
is a sequence of characters. Over the years, alphanumeric and textual passwords
have shown significant disadvantages because they are vulnerable to dictionary
attacks. When it comes to the right proportion between usability and security
people tend to prefer usability. Humans usually provide passwords that are easy
to remember and add no complexity to their daily routine. This choice leads them
to use poor and memorable passwords making the defense against intruders easy
to break.
The problems textual passwords might cause to the protection of personal
data stored in a mobile device were partially solved when graphical passwords
were introduced. These types of security measures were also deployed by the
need of commercial identification of Operating Systems against their competi-
tors. Graphical passwords use pictures, images or patterns to create authenti-
cation schemes, which are easy to remember, fun to use and provide a sense
of uniqueness, while at the same time aiming to be secure enough to prevent
attackers from breaking them. The Android community introduced a popular
graphical authentication method, which is called Android Pattern-Lock. The
Android Pattern-Lock is a 3x3 grid of nodes. In order to unlock their phone,
users swipe their fingers connecting nodes and formulate a memorable shape
that acts as a password. Vision is also engaged in the particular process and this
makes the password easier to remember.
Since the Android Pattern-Lock mechanism was introduced, numerous at-
tempts were made by researchers to decode the way people responded to the new
protection scheme. These studies tried to exploit psychological or physical biases
that might occur when humans try to form a secure or a usable password. One of
the problems we can identify to the graphical password authentication methods
is the lack of interaction between the user and the device while the password is
been generated. Thus, when setting a pattern users are not informed about its
strength. On the other hand, our daily interaction with computers and web sites
that require user identification, projects the importance of providing feedback to
the users that the passwords they chose are not secure enough. A characteristic
example of this concept is the coloured bars next to the password fields when
we create a new account for a web site or when we update our details.
In this paper we investigate whether such feedback prompts actually have
any impact on user perception about the security of an Android pattern. To this
end, we developed an application and collected data from 120 Android users
who participated in a survey about their understanding of Android Pattern-Lock
security. We therefore confirm previous results highlighting that there exist spe-
3cific heuristic rules that define pattern formation. Finally, we propose a password
strength assessment methodology for the Android Pattern-Lock and evaluate its
impact on survey participant responses.
In Sect. 2 we discuss the relevant research on the field of textual and graphical
password security and mention some of the methods used in the past to exploit
potential vulnerabilities present in these schemes. Section 3 provides a dissection
of the experimental methodology we used and defines our metrics. Results and
an evaluating discussion are been presented in Sect. 4. We draw our conclusions
in Sect. 5 and propose future directions for further research.
2 Background and Related Work
Authenticating a user is among the most critical tasks in the area of computer
security and especially when we are dealing with cases with high risk, including
bank transactions, accessing personal information or logging into ad-hoc net-
works [2]. The common form of user authentication, when there is no need for
sophisticated security measures, is a text-based password. Sometimes individ-
uals have to balance between security and usability [13] and the outcome can
be a choice of a weak password because a strong one is di cult to recall [5].
Numerous exploits of text-based passwords have been proposed including dic-
tionary attacks. A well-known tool that performs such type of guessing is ‘John
The Ripper’ [10].
As an alternative to the vulnerable textual passwords, other schemes have
been proposed, known as graphical passwords [4], given the fact that the hu-
man brain reacts better when it has to deal with visual and graphical informa-
tion [14] [17]. The variety of graphical passwords makes them distinct. Various
processes like clicking points on an image or drawing a line can define their for-
mation principles. An example of a graphical authentication is the PassFaces
algorithm [9] that was studied and evaluated for its usability by [6]. However,
human behavioural heuristic rules may a↵ect the e ciency of a graphical pass-
word and make it vulnerable to image-based dictionary attacks [12]. Other types
of graphical authentication include ‘face selection’ mechanisms or ‘point harvest-
ing’ by clicking on specific areas of an image. Studies demonstrated that as users,
we tend to pick faces that attract us [7] and we select distinct regions of interest
on images [16], resulting to high levels of password predictability [11].
In the smartphone universe there exists a very popular and easy to use graph-
ical password identification method called Android Pattern-Lock. This is a two-
dimensional square grid of nine nodes that serves as a drawing canvas. The
smartphone user has to form a shape that links between four and nine nodes,
and this shape is the formal password that allows access to the phone. This is
actually a specialized version of the Pass-Go [15] authentication system focused
on the standardized size of mobile devices. Pass-Go could be considered as an
algorithm that followed the concept of Draw-a-Secret (DaS) scheme [8]. In the
Pass-Go paradigm we have a grid of nxn dots but the password does not need
to be a cohesive line like the Android Pattern-Lock. The Pattern-Lock is a line
4connecting nodes in a 3x3 grid. There are also some basic rules users must have
in mind when they come up with their patterns: At least four nodes should be
lit to form a password, a node cannot be used twice and jumps across unlit
nodes are prohibited. These rules restrict the password space and allow only for
389,112 unique patterns to be drawn [3].
The special characteristics of the aforementioned password scheme make it
an interesting topic for research. Aspects of its usability against security have
been studied in [17]. In a relevant case study [3] researchers demonstrated the
vulnerabilities of touchscreens and conducted attacks (known as smudge attacks)
on graphical passwords using the residues that were left on the screen. This
information, in conjunction with behavioural biases traced from a pilot web
survey, was used in [1] to perform attacks on the Android Pattern-Lock providing
promising results. Our intention here is to confirm those results and examine how
the users would react if they had the ability to be informed by the smartphone
about the strength of the graphical password they chose.
3 Experimental Setup and Definitions
In this section we will present the methodology we used to collect our data and
evaluate them according to the objectives of this study. We want to measure the
password strength of patterns the participants provide and also evaluate their
responses to a feedback tool that informs them if they used a weak or a strong
password.
3.1 Methodology
We developed an application and distributed it through the o cial channel for
Android apps (Play Store). We were aiming to get feedback by Android users
who had the chance to draw their patterns on a real device, simulating the
original user identification method of the phone. First, the participants had to
answer some demographic questions. Then we asked them if they would change
their password if their device gave them feedback that it was a weak one. Two
more questions followed, asking their opinion if the pattern they were about to
draw is usable and secure. The final stage prompted them to draw the actual
pattern. After the pattern was formed, the device calculated and informed the
users about its strength, subsequently asking if they would like to change it or
keep it. They had the right either to change the chosen pattern and draw a new
one or keep it and finish the survey by submitting the results.
The survey was fully anonymized and we also took precautions to avoid
duplicates. We designed the application to be unambiguous and the participants
should not spend more than a few minutes to complete it. The survey was
publicized through the social media in various groups of interest.
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Fig. 1. (a) The topography of the grid, (b) a knight move, (c) a direction change.
3.2 Definitions
The calculation of the password strength was one of the most critical parts of
our study. We based our assumptions and definitions on our pilot study [1] which
illustrated that there exist behavioural biases when humans create their graph-
ical passwords. The basic heuristic rules we derived by the study are: (a) More
than 50% of users start their patterns from the top left node, (b) a pattern
that consists of less than 6 nodes is considered as not secure enough, (c) a se-
cure password is the one that has more than 2 direction changes. Taking these
observations into account, we also included two more features to our password
strength assessment algorithm. The first is the presence of one or more knight
moves and the other is the existence of overlapping nodes. (In Fig. 1 we demon-
trate the topology of nodes (a), we show an example of a knight move (b) and
provide an example of a direction change (c).) We therefore provide the following
definitions.
Let G be a set (representing the Android Pattern-Lock Grid) such that:
G = {n : n 2 N and 0  n  8}.
A pattern P is an ordered set:
P ✓ G : P = {ai : i 2 N and 0  i < |P |, 4  |P |  9},
(|P | is the cardinallity of the set.)
A direction change (abbr. c) happens when there is an angle in the shape
three consecutive nodes form or when we revisit an already visited node. For
example, 367 or 364 constitute a direction change and 2435 define two direction
changes.
A knight move (abbr. k) is an edge that connects two distant nodes, e.g. 07,
05, 16, 15, etc.
An overlapping node (abbr. o) is an already visited node. For instance, the
pattern 0124357 has an overlapping node (the node 4), which gets visited for a
second time when the user moves from node 5 towards node 3.
6k · k defines the number of knight moves or overlapping nodes.
Let X be a 5x1 matrix: X =
266664
x1
x2
x3
x4
x5
377775 and N the 1x5 matrix N = ⇥1 1 1 1 1⇤
where
x1 =
⇢
1 , if a0 6= 0
0 , else
x2 =
⇢ |P |  5 , if |P |   6
0 , else
x3 =
⇢
1 , if c   2
0 , else
x4 = kkk and x5 = kok
x1 evaluates if the starting point of the patten is 0, x2 contributes to the score
if the pattern consists of more than 6 nodes, x3 is used to highlight if there are
more than 2 direction changes and x4, x5 evaluate the presence of knight moves
and overlapping nodes.
Thus, the pattern-lock strength   is defined as:   = N ·X (1)
The feedback   is given to the user in a form of textual information (Weak,
Medium, Strong). There are three scales of security defined from the following
equation.
  =
8><>:
Weak , if 0     1
Medium , if   = 2
Strong , if     3
(2)
4 Results and Discussion
Table 1 provides a generic presentation of the survey results. Most of the par-
ticipants were male aged between 18-29 years old. As discussed previously, the
survey was publicized through university related channels; hence the education
level of the participants is quite high. The vast majority of the people that took
the survey are smartphone owners, and they currently have devices running the
Android OS. They prefer to use the Pattern-Lock mechanism to protect personal
information, prevent others fiddling with the phone or protect data if someone
steals their phone (Question 9). One of the most interesting questions for the
current study is Question 10. We wanted to know if they would change their cho-
sen password if they were informed by some kind of feedback, provided by the
device, that their password is weak; 77.5% of them answered a rmatively. Fi-
nally, most of the replies suggest that the users believe that their chosen pattern
is usable as well as secure.
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Number Question Category Percentage
Q1 Gender
Male 60.0%
Female 34.2%
Didn’t say 5.8%
Q2 Age
18 - 29 y.o. 60.8%
30 - 39 y.o. 35.0%
40+ y.o. 4.2%
Q3 Ethnicity
African-American 39.2%
White 25.8%
Asian 21.7%
Hispanic/Latin 11.7%
Others 1.6%
Q4 Education
Bachelor’s 40.0%
Master’s 40.0%
Doctorate 11.7%
High School & Other 8.3%
Q5 Smartphone user
Yes 99.2%
No 0.8%
Q6 Smartphone usage
6 - 12 months 45.1%
1 - 6 years 30.1%
less than 6 months 24.8%
more than 6 years 1.7%
Q7 Smartphone OS
Android 82.5%
iOS 30.1%
Blackberry 4.2%
Windows Phone OS 1.7%
Q8 Preferred password type
Pattern Lock 53.3%
PIN 39.2%
Others 7.5%
Q10 Password meter e↵ect
Yes 77.5%
No 22.5%
Q11 Usable pattern provided
Yes 81.7%
No 18.3%
Q12 Secure pattern provided
Yes 86.7%
No 13.3%
Table 2. Direction changes in the set of patterns
Changes Number Frequency
1 13 10.8%
2 26 21.7%
3 31 25.8%
4 33 27.5%
5 14 11.6%
6 2 1.6%
7 1 ⇡1%
84.1 Analysing Pattern Characteristics
The analysis of certain characteristics the patterns had (direction changes and
pattern length, which is measured by the number of nodes that constitute the
shape) provided the results we demonstrate in Tables 2 and 3. In Table 2 for
example we can see that for the majority of patterns, their shape introduces 2 - 4
direction changes. Also, Table 3 shows that even if we use a feedback method
to engage users to a better understanding of security, the outcome will still be
patterns that basically consist of 5 - 7 nodes.
We believe that this is an observation that diversifies the users and keep
the authentication method reliable from being predictable. If we force the user
to provide stronger passwords that consist of 8 - 9 nodes (to be considered
as stronger and safe) and loop around the nodes to produce a lot of direction
changes, we eventually minimize the already limited password space of the An-
droid Pattern-Lock method. Thus, a very strict feedback schema would probably
have the opposite results than making the authentication method stronger and
this is reflected in the definition of our strength criteria (Equation 2).
Table 3. Pattern length in the set of patterns
Length Number Frequency
4 17 14.2%
5 23 19.2%
6 25 20.8%
7 24 20.0%
8 13 10.8%
9 18 15.0%
4.2 Comparison with Previous Results
One of our objectives when we designed the experiment was to evaluate previous
results we presented during a pilot study which examined (in a similar way)
if there exist any heuristic rules that are responsible for specific biases in the
provided patterns [1]. The experiments in this study were conducted using a web
application, thus, the participants were not really interacting with a smartphone
device but with the monitor of their computer. In addition, they were not using
their fingers to form their passwords on the screen because it was an online survey
and the interaction medium of the application and the user was the mouse. These
characteristics and the fact that the whole procedure was a simulation of the
original user authentication method, could force people to answer in a di↵erent
way when they were interacting with a smartphone.
Figures 2 and 3 demonstrate that user reactions are quite similar in both
experiments. We must underline here that the participants in both experiments
9Fig. 2. Frequency of starting points.
were di↵erent and the second study took place two years after the first. In Fig. 2
we can see that more than 50% chose to start their patterns from node 0. Nodes
2 and 6 are also popular starting points and we can conclude that participants
preferred to begin their drawings from the corners of the grid. Figure 3 illustrates
the most common bigrams, trigrams and fourgrams. These are sub-patterns that
exist in the password and provide information about the most common edges
that were formed during the drawing of the pattern. A comparison with [1] shows
that indeed the upper nodes are heavily utilized during password formation.
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 3. The most common: (a) Bigrams, (b) trigrams, (c) fourgrams.
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4.3 Evaluating the Feedback Responses
Table 4 concatenates the results of our research describing user perceptions about
the security of the Android Pattern-Lock method and their responses to our
feedback prompt. The findings we highlight in Table 4 evaluate the responses
after the feedback prompt was shown to the participants. Hence, these are the
final choices the users of our proposed scheme made. The password strength of
the resulting patterns is almost equally distributed among the three scales. As
expected, the ‘Weak’ passwords were fewer after the feedback was propounded.
One observation we can make is that the majority of male users came up with
stronger passwords in contrast to the patterns females chose.
In addition, 23.3% of the participants changed their choice of pattern when
they were informed about the valence of their password. This means that almost
one out of five users changed their pattern to make it stronger when the feedback
underlined the lack of security of their initial choice. Another interesting finding
that strengthens the importance of such a feedback mechanism is the fact that
10.7% of the people that finally changed their graphical password had said before
(in Question 10) that they would not take into account any evaluation of their
password strength from the device. Thus, one out of nine people paid attention
to the feedback mechanism and changed the pattern they chose even though
they had said (seconds before) that they would not do that.
Table 4. Password strength assesment
Scale Number Percentage Gender Number Percentage
Weak 32 26.6%
Male 15 46.9%
Female 12 37.5%
Didn’t say 5 15.6%
Medium 44 36.7%
Male 28 63.6%
Female 16 36.4%
Strong 44 36.7%
Male 29 66.0%
Female 13 29.5%
Didn’t say 2 4.5%
Remarks Number Percentage
Changed Pattern 28/120 23.3%
Changed despite their ‘No’ at Q10 3/28 10.7%
Didn’t Change ‘Weak’ despite their ‘Yes’ 26/120 21.7%
Changed from ‘Weak’ to ‘Weak’ 2/28 7.1%
On the contrary 21.7%, meaning one out of five users, did not change their
‘Weak’ passwords although they had answered that they would consider a feed-
back from the device. Perhaps a more aggressive design strategy and a more
exhorting message would be su cient to change this feature. Finally, one out of
fourteen participants that changed their patterns, they chose ‘Weak’ passwords
again. An explanation to this observation might be that there is a small part
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of users that prefer a very usable pattern ignoring the security a more complex
drawing provides.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
In this study we compared our results with previous knowledge justifying that
there are specific behavioural biases that define the formation of graphical pat-
terns. We proposed a scheme, which measures the strength of Android Pattern-
Lock instances and reported the e↵ects a feedback prompt would have to users.
We demonstrated that the majority of people that participated in our experi-
ments were positively a↵ected by the suggestions about security our proposed
algorithm produced. They finally changed their passwords and this outcome
resulted to stronger user authentication paradigms.
Further work should include the investigation of the impact other features
might have at the calculation of the password strength. The password valence
assessment criteria could include ending points, bigrams, trigrams and dexterity;
the algorithm could also assign di↵erent weights to the final evaluation criteria
of the password strength. Another issue we should take into consideration is how
aggressive and persuasive a feedback prompt could be in order to provide to the
user a better understanding of security without decreasing the password space
of the Android Pattern-Lock method.
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